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Consuming Youth: Timorese in the
Resistance Against Indonesian
Occupation
Angie Bexley and Nuno Rodrigues Tchailoro
This article explores the role played by risk-seeking Timorese youth, known as the New
Generation (Gerac¸ao Foun), in the resistance movement against Indonesian occupation
(19751999). It discusses the capture, regimentation and marginalisation of youthful
radicalism by the national resistance movement. The paper looks at these processes of
youth revolutionary involvement sympathetically though the memories of former
participants in the clandestine struggle and is representative of a new reflexive phase
in young Timorese’ post-colonial self-realisation. This phase is decidedly non-
triumphalist, one which dwells on the inability to be ‘recompensed’ for the dreams
that were captured and lives that were side-tracked in a conflict that consumed youth.
Keywords: Timor Leste; Youth; Resistance; Agency; Postcolonial Memory
Introduction
Generational dynamics are a critical element of Timor-Leste’s modern history. Since
the Portuguese-educated youth referred to themselves as the Generation of ’75
(Gerac¸a˜o ’75) for their role in the anti-colonial movement against the Portuguese, the
impetus to define generational experience within the cast of nationalism has
remained: as Nora (1992, 511) remarked, ‘belonging to a generation is not simply
a way to be free, it is also the only way not to be alone’. During the Indonesian
occupation (19751999), a younger generation of Indonesian-educated Timorese
referred to themselves as the New Generation (Gerac¸a˜o Foun) and played a central
role in Timor’s Independence from Indonesia. After Timor’s Independence in 2002,
tensions between these two generations played out in debates concerning language,
belonging and national identity (Bexley 2007a, 2007b, 2009). A decade later, a
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minority of Gerac¸a˜o Foun has moved into politics and senior government positions,
joining the Gerac¸a˜o ’75 political leaders (McWilliam and Bexley 2007). The majority
of the Gerac¸a˜o Foun, however, remains unsatisfied with Independence and feels
marginalised from its political processes. Debates among this group have turned to
the past, the role of youth and the nature of the resistance movement in order to re-
position themselves in post-colonial Timor-Leste.
The forums for such expressions of disillusionment are both private and public.
Discussions among former clandestine leaders and ordinary members are being put
into print, the most well known is Naldo Rei’s (2007) autobiography, Resistance: A
Childhood Fighting for East Timor, and a range of local publications such as Klaak (see
Bexley 2009 for a complete description of the origins of the magazine and Nygaard-
Christensen 2010). This article draws on these public reflections, as well as those of
Nuno Rodrigues (a member of the student movement) and those he has recorded
with members of the clandestine movement1 and is also substantiated by my own
ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2005 and 2009. These post-Independence
reflections by former clandestine members represent a post-colonial reflexive turn
unique to this period of time.2 As a part of this process, Gerac¸a˜o Foun members are
creating alternative versions of history that do not align with the national narrative of
unity pertinent to the nation-building project and instead focus on the coercive,
conflicting and often violent nature of the resistance movement.
Motivations for reassessing the past among members of the Gerac¸a˜o Foun are a
part of a larger narrative of redistributive justice that became a national trope since
Independence. In her work among the ethno-linguistic group of the Mambai,
anthropologist Elizabeth Traube found a vision that centres around the idea that the
nation was won through suffering and sacrifice; it was ‘purchased’, the saying goes,
‘not with silver or gold, but with the blood of the people’. As Traube (2007, 21)
explains, ‘the formula is simple: those who pursued their own selfish interests and
prospered under the occupation should be made to pay, while those who suffered and
sacrificed for independence should be recompensed’. While this sense of retribution is
strong among the Gerac¸a˜o Foun, youth is a currency that can never be redeemed.
Memory, however, and the contestation of memory, is one way that Timorese are
shaping the post-colonial nation-building project. Here, I draw on the work of
Zurbuchen (2005) about contesting history through memory and the different
aspects of individual and social processes in shaping representations of past and
present. Das and Kleinman (2001, 6) in their discussion of social suffering and
recovery also discuss ‘agentive moments’ where:
finding one’s voice in the making of one’s history, the remaking of a world, though,
is also a matter of being able to recontextualise the narratives of devastation and
generate new contexts through which everyday life may become possible . . .
communities in suffering do not always succeed in this.
In the case of Timor-Leste, this could refer to the ways in which many Timorese are
reflecting on and making meaning out of their involvement in the clandestine
406 A. Bexley and N. Rodrigues Tchailoro
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
us
tra
lia
n N
ati
on
al 
Un
ive
rsi
ty]
 at
 20
:54
 05
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
movement during their most influential years in their teens and early twenties.
However, the success in which they can create new contexts is limited.
In Timor-Leste, ‘youth’ was constructed as a powerful symbolic and productive
category called upon during the resistance against Indonesian occupation as ‘hope for
the nation’ (Naafs and White 2012). Post-Independence,3 Timorese government
discourse on young Timorese is typified by ‘youth defectology’ (Comaroff and
Comaroff 2005), highlighting young people as a violent problem (World Bank Report
2007; Scambary, Gama Da, and Barreto 2006) that needs to be resolved by their
incorporation into neoliberalism by working in low-paid jobs (ILO 2009). However,
these discourses discount the historical evolution of the concept of youth in Timor-
Leste and the ways in which the resistance movement produced the notion of
‘danger-seeking’ youth. This paper seeks to understand how the category of youth has
been constituted in relation to forms of power, and to what extent young Timorese
can now forge an understanding of themselves outside the tropes of either ‘hero’ or
‘villain’ in the nation-building project.
In the Beginning: Young Timorese in the Resistance Against Indonesian
Occupation
At the end of 1978, the Indonesian military had destroyed the Timorese armed
resistance front in the jungle. Civilians, military cadets and FRETILIN4 supporters
had either surrended or been arrested. This forced the resistance movement to adopt
a new strategy.
Clandestine activities had been undertaken since the beginning of the Indonesian
invasion. The families that did not seek refuge in the mountains undertook activites
such as communication and logistics for those family members fighting in the
mountains (CAVR 2005). Usually, these clandestine activities were undertaken in a
spontaneous manner, however, in a number of villages, such as Mehara and the
surrounding villages in the islands of far eastern district of Lautem, the people
became more organised in their clandestine activities from 1976 onwards (interview
with Nuno Rodrigues Tchailoro, Dili, February 20, 2012).
News of the organisation of Mehara and surrounding villages travelled to Xanana
Gusma˜o and he left his hideout in the Matebian ranges in the east to go to Los Palos,
the main centre of the most easterly Lautem district. While in hiding, Xanana
Gusma˜o had also been in communication with local citizens and youth organisations.
In December 1978, Gusma˜o began to enlist the help of Timorese who had been
recruited to the Indonesian military. In 1980, Gusma˜o made further contact by
organising a door-to-door campaign and from there he began to understand how to
conduct a guerrilla campiagn with the assistance of those who had surrendered and
were living on the edges of the main city centres (interview with Rodrigues Tchailoro
2012). From that point onwards, young Timorese were targeted to became involved
in the clandestine movement.
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In the two years of survival in the mountains after the Indonesian invasion, young
people had been educated about revolutionary emancipation from colonialism by
FRETILIN (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares 2012, 56). In the cities, however,
youth were frustrated at their lack of control over the situation upon Indonesian
invasion. Many formed small, incoherent vigilante-type groups. Young Timorese
were incredibly vulnerable due to war and displacement. They experienced a radical
disjuncture between their childhood and the brutality of occupation as they came of
age. One of these groups was FITUN, organised around a suburb in Dili. Its explicit
focus was retaliation against Indonesian occupation. One of the founders of FITUN,
Elisario Ferreira, recalls: ‘In its beginnings, FITUN was just a gang with the objective
of bashing and getting rid of new transmigrant arrivals from Indonesia’ (interview
with Rodrigues Tchailoro 2012). The leaders of the armed resistance realised that the
energy of young people could be diverted into more purposeful pursuits assisting the
armed forces. A number of youth organisations were established in rapid succession
including Sagrada Familia and OPJLATIL. These had the explicit function of carrying
out logistical and tactical commands from FALINTIL. A senior member of Sagrada
Familia, Andre da Costa Belo L4, noted (interview with Nuno Rodrigues Tchailoro,
Dili, January 19, 2012) that this youth organisation (and others) explicitly targeted
youths who were known to drink alcohol and become involved in fights.
This recruitment strategy coalesces with the experiences of youth in Indonesia
during the revolution (19451949).5 It was common for recruitment tactics to focus
on the fringes of urban society where disempowered youth were most likely to be
found.6 Indeed, Cribb (1991) underscored the importance of the Jakarta underworld
in challenging Dutch authority and this linked them with the revolutionary alliance
of young nationalists in 1945.
Scholarly analyses (Honwana 2006) of why young people were, and continue to be,
involved in armed conflicts illustrate that young people make good soldiers because
they are especially susceptible to ideological conditioning and because of their
brashness and sense of invulnerability. It is in this way that young Timorese born
from 1970s onwards came to experience youth. The conditions of the Indonesian
occupation and their involvement in the resistance movement significantly narrowed
the ways in which they experienced their transition to adulthood and the autonomy
they had in their own roles as members of the clandestine movement.
In Schools: A Time of Growth and Autonomy for the Youth Movement
Former student activist Nuno Rodrigues recalls that young Timorese started to group
together in high schools and realised they shared experiences as young children in the
bush, fleeing the bombings and raids of the Indonesian military, having family
members in the forest and then later the shared experiences of bravery and discipline
that came with working in the clandestine movement. Over time their organising
abilities became increasingly constrained by the wider structures of the resistance
movement.
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At the same time, the Indonesian government was focused on building the
administration in Timor-Leste. One of the main priorities was education. The
motivation for this was to stamp out radicalism and dissent towards the Indonesian
occupation by inculcating them with the moral values of the Indonesian New Order
state, known as Pancasila. However, young Timorese seized the opportunity of being
back on school grounds to regroup and refocus their clandestine activities. Schools, and
particularly Catholic schools, such as Salesian Fatumaka in Baucau, were a breeding
ground for activities. For Rodrigues Tchailoro and many others of his generation, it was
this school in particular that provided critical exposure to other students who told
stories of their time in the forest fighting the Indonesian military. This was the turning
point for Rodrigues’s own consciousness, as he himself came from an apolitical family
who did not seek refuge in the jungle after the 1975 invasion and thus did not know the
extent of the resistance movement or its objectives. At the Salesian Fatumaka,
Rodrigues Tchailoro was first exposed to the ideas and concepts of nationalism.
Schooling as a breeding ground for nationalist thought is not unique to Timor-
Leste. In neighbouring Indonesia, young Indonesians in Dutch schools also found
them to be places of nascent nationalism. Anderson (1972, 18) observed that:
Nationalism was the only explanation that could be given for each student’s having
made the journey from whatever home he had left to enter one classroom with the
others. Only nationalism made sense of the new life on which they were collectively
embarked.
As already stated, recruitment of youth into the clandestine movement became
critical for Timor’s national resistance movement against Indonesia. This was
conducted through a cellular structure where one person would recruit a further
seven people and so on. As a general rule, new recruits were identified through family
connections. McWilliam (2005) notes these were referred to as selcom: coordinated
hamlet-level networks. However, the schools and university campuses increasingly
became hotbeds of recruitment, extending well beyond the family unit, particularly in
the late 1980s and 1990s (see Bexley 2009 for the ways in which the clandestine
movement undermined, rather than strengthened, family relationships). The new
recruit would undergo a training process which involved the clandestine member
following their every move for a couple of months in order to be certain they were
not a member of ‘intel’, or an Indonesian police ‘spy’.
After the training process, the new recruit would receive information only through
cassettes from the leaders, flyers or meeting directly with FALINTIL members or at
demonstrations. However, cell members had little knowledge of who or what was
happening beyond their immediate cell contact, ostensibly so they were not in a
position to give up comrades under torture.
For many young Timorese, the Santa Cruz massacre became the catalyst for their
involvement in the clandestine movement. On 12 November 1991, thousands of
young Timorese met in Dili to mourn the death of Sebastia˜o Gomes Rangel, killed
inside the Motael Church two weeks earlier by the Indonesian military. By the time
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the procession reached the cemetery, the crowd had swelled to 40005000, including
uniformed children from a nearby school. About 1000 mainly young Timorese
remained in front of the cemetery entrance and others, including the Gomes family,
entered the cemetery to pray and lay flowers. As truckloads of Indonesian military
carrying automatic weapons surrounded them, the peaceful funeral procession of
respect turned into an arena of violence and death. Without any warning, the military
opened fire on the crowd who fled over tombstones and high walls. The death toll is
estimated at approximately 200. Naldo Rei (2007, 51) describes the harrowing
experience:
There was total chaos. With automatic gunfire all around me, I became very afraid.
In front of my eyes there were bodies falling everywhere, sprawled at all angles and
smeared with blood. People began running towards the gates to escape, but this was
right into the line of fire. Most were not killed outright so soldiers quickly ran
between the graves bayoneting people to death. I witnessed this as I dodged this
way and that, to find an escape route the opposite way. I jumped over the brick
wall, the only one without soldiers, of the houses on the other side, normally far
too high to be scaled by my small, skinny, sixteen-year-old self. But fear gave me
wings and I was able to escape from the slaughter yard.
The Santa Cruz massacre, as the incident became known most acutely through the
video footage of journalist Max Stahl, and stills taken by British photographer Steve
Cox, caught the attention of the international community. Most significantly, the
images of martyred youth marked the imaginations of young Timorese and acted as a
catalyst for young people to join the clandestine resistance movement.
Although the activities of the youth groups and FALINTIL provided a framework
through which young people could channel their frustrations and energies into the
pursuit of freedom from Indonesian occupation, it also narrowed the possibility of
ways youth were able to organise themselves. As a consequence, the activities of the
independent youth ‘nationalist’ groups that were rallying inside the schools began to
be curtailed. Under the FALINTIL hierarchy, their ability to make decisions or
strategise their future actions was curtailed, as all plans had to be approved by the
chief, Xanana Gusma˜o. The effect of this new structure was that all organisations
became subordinate to FALINTIL.
Youth Resistance: A Controlled Agency
By the 1990s, youth incorporation into the clandestine movement was growing. The
Timorese governor, Ma´rio Carrascala˜o, was responsible for forging the path for
Timorese to enter higher education in Indonesia. While the Indonesian military
wanted to ‘shut-off ’ Timor from the rest of the world in order to quell the resistance,
Carrascala˜o saw an opportunity to ‘win the hearts and minds’ (Anderson, Djati, and
Kamme 2003) of the Timorese through non-violent means. Around 15,000 scholar-
ships were available to any student provided they swore an oath of allegiance to the
Indonesian New Order Pancasila ideology. Although this education was meant as a
410 A. Bexley and N. Rodrigues Tchailoro
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tool of social control, the exposure to the Indonesian pro-democracy front solidified
their resistance to Indonesian New Order control.
During the 1990s, Indonesian university campuses underwent a significant period
of control. However, the attempts by the New Order regime to remove the political
activity within the university setting encouraged their politicisation further (see
Aspinall 2005). With this, young Timorese were exposed to other ideas about
democracy and how youth could contribute. Timorese students participated in
discussions on campus and off campus with Indonesian activists and became
involved in pro-democracy underground media such as Kabar dari Pijar. This
underground media highlighted not only the human rights abuses in Timor but held
within it the realisation that both the Timorese and Indonesians were victims of the
same regime. They began to use their agency to discuss the ways that young Timorese
could contribute to Timor’s nationhood after Independence.
The students recruiting other young Timorese into the urban front were organised
through RENETIL (Resistensia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor-Leste, National
Resistance of Timorese students) whose networks included Timorese students in
Indonesia as well as Indonesian activists, journalists, intellectuals and human rights
advocates. The clandestine front, of which RENETIL became a central pillar, took on
a more meaningful role alongside the diplomatic and armed FALINTIL front within
the independence struggle; particularly, as it became clearer that the struggle would
not be won through armed combat.7 RENETIL was formed in Bali in 1989 and
continued organising students in Indonesia until the popular consultation in 1999.8
The principal strategies they used included demonstrations and occupation of foreign
embassies known as ‘fence jumping’ (Ind.: lompat pagar).
RENETIL members were strongly encouraged to run for IMPPETTU elections
(Timorese students in Java and Bali were obliged to join the official student
organisation, The East Timorese Student and Youth Association (Ikatan Mahasiswa,
Pemuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur*IMPPETTU)). The two organisations, RENETIL
and IMPPETTU, overlapped since the Chair of IMPPETTU’s national board,
Mariano Sabino Lopes, was also the deputy secretary of RENETIL.9 By 1995, nearly
all IMPPETTU chapters were led, or at least dominated, by RENETIL members.10
Based on this strategy, RENETIL, which at the time had only around 1300 members,
also had access to the 5000 students in Indonesia who were all required by the
Indonesian authorities to join IMPPETTU chapters. This gave the political
organisation of RENETIL access to a larger support network.
After 1990, the agency that Timorese youth had cultivated, in terms of strategising
about the resistance to Indonesian occupation, particularly on Java, was curtailed.
Nuno Rodrigues recalls:
Before I became involved in RENETIL, I was involved in student organisations at
university where issues and plans were openly discussed. However, after I became
involved in RENETIL, this all changed and because it was operating as a semi-
clandestine organisation, it prioritised secrecy above all else. The result of this is
that a huge gap became apparent between the knowledge of the leaders of RENETIL
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and the ‘militants’/activists. When I was in RENETIL, I knew that all planned
demonstrations must await the direction and instruction from above. The
Commander in chief of the resistance movement (Xanana Gusma˜o) would instruct
the leaders of RENETIL and from there the messages would filter down on a need-
to-know basis in order to carry out the demonstration.
Youth organisations, from the early 1990s onwards, experienced independence in that
they were able to form alliances with the Indonesian pro-democracy front. After
RENETIL became included under the hierarchical structure of FALINTIL, their
independence was curtailed and they could only exercise a degree of autonomy with
regard to their resistance activities. Their activities were limited to recruiting new
clandestine movement members, organising logistics in the public campaign for the
fight for Independence and taking part in the demonstrations against occupation.
The prominent feature of Timorese youth organisations during this time, however,
was the regimentation and hierarchical nature of their organisational structure and
activities. It is significant that the only youth groups that were permitted to operate
under the resistance struggle were those authorised by Xanana Gusma˜o. During this
time, it was generally accepted that the loss of autonomy was necessary for the greater
objective of obtaining Independence from Indonesian occupation. However, upon
reflection, many clandestine members have pointed to the degree in which the
process of control by the Commander in Chief Xanana Gusma˜o, resulted in the youth
organisations having no independent programs or autonomy to decide on the
direction of the resistance movement, or indeed, what role they might play after
Independence.
A military logic pervaded all youth organisations in their focus and activities which
narrowed to concentrate on fighting Indonesian occupation, rather than preparing
themselves for Independence. In this process, the clandestine operation became
completely subordinate to the military hierarchy of FALINTIL. The ways in which
youth behaviour was expected to conform to military hierarchies became a part of
the military logic and regimentation that was central to the discourse of national
unity. The directives for this change in behaviour came mostly from the leader of the
resistance movement, Xanana Gusma˜o.
Leader’s Discourse: Youth as Heroes
In the mid-1980s, Xanana Gusma˜o began writing to the Timorese youth individually
and collectively in order to foster a sense of unity and to encourage their ongoing
participation in the clandestine movement. These communique´s involved commands
to organise demonstrations and deliver messages to other leaders, particularly
throughout the 1990s. Most of all, these letters inspired notions of self-sacrifice and
patriotism within young Timorese which became key markers of youth identity.
Coinciding with this were the ways in which Xanana Gusma˜o was able to establish
himself as a father figure and thus elicit a child-like obedience from the youth. Naldo
412 A. Bexley and N. Rodrigues Tchailoro
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Rei (2007, 3738) reflects in his autobiography how young Timorese were in awe of
their leader:
To me, at sixteen, Xanana seemed a kind of God. He was so warm, interested in
each person in the struggle, smiled frequently and all his body language indicated
that he was relaxed. He had twinkling eyes, pale skin and was taller than most of us
which added to his mystique.
Young Timorese were greatly impressed by their leader and were prepared to do
anything he asked of them. A letter written to Rei, a young man at the time,
demonstrates the profound authority of Gusma˜o in an order to risk his life to
organise a demonstration at the Dutch embassy in 1995. Gusma˜o’s letter (cited in Rei
2007, 148) read:
That’s why now I’m ordering you all! Have the spirit of responsibility and sacrifice.
You must stand mosquitoes, stand being hungry, thirsty, stand the coldness, stand
dirty clothes and smelling bad, and stand repression from the embassy. Putu [the
code name given to Naldo Rei by Gusma˜o] must tell our friends that the guerrilla
movement has endured this for the last twenty years and their sacrifice is why the
struggle still continues.
The primacy of the ‘foot soldier’ role that young Timorese played throughout the
resistance movement has been noted by members of the clandestine movement (see
de Araujo 2000; Mok 1996). Rei (2007, 149) reflects on the gravitas of being issued
such a responsibility and the conforming nature of youth:
But in my heart I was questioning why I had been chosen as the leader, and why I
had to take part in the action at all. Previously Xanana had forbidden me to take
part in embassy actions because it was too public; my job was underground, as in
East Timor. I was only twenty, young to be a leader, and most of my comrades were
older than me . . . I knew it was an important action or Xanana would not have
asked to change my role and, I reminded myself, a good freedom fighter does not
ask too many questions and works hard. It was this that pushed me to accept his
order.
This is just one example of the ways in which Xanana Gusma˜o established the father
role and the parent-child obedience that was expected of young Timorese in the
clandestine movement. While many members accepted that this was a way of
instilling discipline into the resistance movement, it is also clear that the idea of
‘youth’ was utilised as a key symbol and heroic image which became fundamental
propaganda directed towards the youth to sustain hope and commitment to the
struggle.
In one of the more public letters from Xanana Gusma˜o (written in Portuguese
and Tetum and photocopied, passed around and read out at public gatherings),
he clearly highlighted the importance of the youth in the interests of the nation. The
rhetoric in his public letters demonstrated the powerful and emotive pull of the
construction of youth as (masculine and militarised) heroes and their constructed
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agency of being involved in the national struggle. One letter (cited in Gusma˜o and
Niner 2000) read:
On behalf of the CRRN [Council of National Resistance] and the glorious
FALINTIL, as well as on my own behalf, I express our profound esteem and
congratulations to you on your energetic and courageous stance at this historic
time of vital importance to our thousand-times heroic and beloved Maubere
people! I address myself today especially to you, Beloved youth and Maubere
Patriots, for you are the vigorous blood of our people and the promise of the future
of our beloved Homeland, East Timor. In this bloody journey of our people your
participation in the struggle for national liberation is a moral duty and, above all, it
is a political and historical obligation.
The words of first Indonesian President, Sukarno, in his rallying calls to the youth on
the eve of independence in Indonesia, offer pertinent comparisons with the above
construction of youth as socio-political subjects with limited agency. Importantly, the
allure of danger and courage was at the forefront of this construction. As a
compelling orator, Sukarno went to great lengths to promote youth and youthful
attributes*in particular, activism, dynamism and reckless courage. These symbols
were evoked in order to create and maintain certain attitudes and states of mind (see
Feith 1963). The politics of these political manifestations have been termed ‘the
politics of rejuvenation’ (McIntyre 2005, 64). Throughout his presidency, Sukarno
advocated the youthful attribute of reckless courage, much in the same way as
Gusma˜o did among young Timorese.
Living dangerously was particularly appealing for young Timorese. Xanana
Gusma˜o points out that as young children, many Timorese were already living
dangerously. Through his carefully placed language, Xanana Gusma˜o weaves their
disjointed and painful lives into a narrative focused on heroism and unity. He
connects their disjointed lives with that of their families, whom many did not meet
for years, and positions the clandestine movement as a surrogate family and himself
as the surrogate father.
Gusma˜o, like the leader of Indonesian Independence Sukarno, was a ‘symbol
wielder’ (Feith 1963) and his discourse on youth-as-heroes closely linked the youth’s
fate with that of the nation. The symbol of youth was created as courageous,
patriotic, masculine and militarised with the higher pursuit of obtaining Indepen-
dence from Indonesian occupation. Parallel to the formation of youth-as-heroes
came a change in the attitudes and behaviour of the youth to match the powerful
symbol of youth which also suited the purpose of the resistance movement.
Characteristics of New Recruits
After the 1990s as the focus on youth recruitment became more intense, the
clandestine movement placed an emphasis on the types of personal attributes and
characteristics that new recruits were expected to portray. While this applied to both
male and female recruits, it seemed to particularly target young males. It also
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appealed to their sense of masculinity. The attributes took the form of bodily
transformations, attitude adjustments through a series of rituals and indoctrination
that highlighted the militant and the masculine. Within this process, the sense of self-
sacrifice, allegiance and loyalty were made a priority. The four main characteristics
(Rodrigues personal communication, 2009) were:
Bravery, discipline, secrecy and willingness to receive commands (subordination)
An oath of secrecy was required and involved kissing the FRETILIN and RDTL flag
and drinking the blood of other clandestine members.
Bravery was considered a characteristic that could be attained or bravery (‘bravery
plus’) through the use of black magic, referred to as jimad or lulic. This black magic
was capable of providing the clandestine movement member with immunity
against bullets, or the ability to escape from the military if caught.
An ideological stance on the resistance movement. Clandestine movement
members were required to advance national unity by interpreting the struggle
for freedom as the struggle against the Indonesian military. Discussion about how
society should run after Independence was not permitted. Resistance leaders made
promises about dealing with social issues such as poverty and employment
opportunities ‘after obtaining independence’.
The regimentation of youth organisations also changed the sorts of activities in which
youth were involved. The focus on the personal attribute of ‘bravery’ saw many turn
their attention to magic and recruit the assistance of village elders believed to be
‘experts’ in this sort of magic. The youth organisations most involved in these
activities included Sinco Sinco (55), Sete Sete (77) and Sagrada Familia (for more on
these groups see Scambary, Gama Da, and Barreto 2006; Myrtinnen 2012). These
groups existed only in order for young (mainly) men to acquire magical potency so
they could carry out their tasks within the clandestine movement.
As the leader of the resistance movement, Xanana Gusma˜o placed a deeper
significance on lulic (Tet.: Sacred, magical) powers which have been variously
described as being dangerous and sacred (McWilliam 2001). Young Timorese men
would mark a wound on their upper arm and insert magical dust leaving a tattoo-like
mark. The practice was known as isin knanek (Tet.: Magical dust). This isin knanek
was meant to act as a sort of immunity against harm but was also a distinguishing
identity marker of belonging to the different clandestine groups.
The leader of Sete Sete, Carlito da Silva Sana Mea, stated that jimad had always
been used amongst its members, but increased from 1979. One of the reasons given
for its increase was the destruction of the liberated zones and the end of FRETILIN’s
political programs of emancipation. The use of magic became a permanent
preoccupation of young Timorese men, to the point where it framed the ways in
which they thought about the struggle and aligned themselves within the FALINTIL
hierarchy. The founder of the OPJLATIL organisation, Vasco da Gama Criado, said of
the use of magic (interview with Nuno Rodrigues, Dili, June 10, 2009): ‘For me,
jimad was like a weapon used by FALINTIL in the jungle to protect themselves (from
the Indonesian military)’. During the resistance movement, young Timorese drew
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upon existing beliefs about their connection to the land and lulic beliefs, such as the
power of the invisible, in the creation of their own distinct rituals in the formulation
of a militarised youth culture, as Rei (2007, 17) makes explicit in his autobiography:
I crouched down carefully in the undergrowth and, focusing my energy and will,
called upon my ancestors, the land and rocks to protect me . . . The land, the rocks and
the spirits of my ancestors responded. The enemy walked all around me. My heart was
beating fast and I held my breath but stayed focused on the power of the land. I could
see the soldiers’ boots and the tips of their guns, but they could not see me.
Secrecy was the most important characteristic of clandestine members. Rei (2007, 31)
reflects further on his experiences of being recruited and the level of secrecy, which
for many became a way of life:
One day he [Naldo’s brother] took me to a friend’s house in Dili and introduced
me to the young people there who were from different regions of East Timor. From
then on, my brother would ask me to take a letter or others things to them and my
courier work began. I did not ask what was inside the letters but I suspected what
was going on. He had started to link people together in one of the clandestine
networks in Dili as part of the struggle . . . My brother Alarico became very
withdrawn and never divulged where he was going which worried me a lot and,
although I did ask him about these people, he only told me that they were good.
Within this process of self-renewal, a particular type of recruit was moulded where
the characteristics of self-sacrifice, allegiance and secrecy were made a priority. Rather
than youthful energies being channelled into discussion about what role they would
play after Independence, many young Timorese men directed their energies into
obtaining the militarised characteristics so desired by the resistance movement.
Playing Both Sides
One of the effects of the militarisation of young people was that they found themselves
involved in the war on both sides. While Rei’s narrative is common among Gerac¸a˜o
Foun members, an equally common experience less openly or publicly discussed, is the
involvement of young Timorese in Indonesian military operations. Civilians were
forcibly recruited to act as military operational support personnel (Ind.: Tenaga
Bantuan Operasi, TBO). Officially, The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) recruited
civilian males aged between twelve and thirty-five years. However, in reality boys
much younger and men much older were involved, as well as women. Groups of these
people were attached to a particular military unit for the operation. The total number
of civilians involved was very large. A 1982 military document states that the operation
included ‘60,000 civilians in addition to the WANRA and RATIH’ (CAVR 2005, 91).
Other sources indicate even more were involved, mentioning eight battalions and
120,000 guided militia (Ind.: milisi binaan) moving east to west (CAVR 2005, 91). In
mid-1981, the TBOs were recruited into an operation known as Operasi Kikis
(Operation Eliminate). They formed a human fence to encircle FALINTIL on Mount
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Matebian from Tutuala and Viqueque but did not succeed in capturing any significant
figures (CAVR 2005, 91).
The Timorese resistance movement and the Indonesian military shared key tactics
in using young Timorese. This deeply saddening reality resulted in the loss of
childhood innocence. Indeed, this is one of the main points of Rei’s autobiography.
Reflecting on the legacies of his childhood in the movement, he says (Rei 2007, 278):
‘I feel I missed out on childhood and can never get it back’. This feeling of forgoing
childhood is amplified in the general sentiment from other ex-clandestine members
who refer to their participation in the clandestine as being ‘tricked’. They were young
and impressionable and did not know the consequences of being in a liminal
position*neither child nor adult, but a utility of war.
The effects of their liminal position was expressed by Nino (interview in Los Palos,
October 2005) from Los Palos, now in his thirties, who explains how children played
roles on both sides of the war:
Yeah, I worked for FALINTIL. We had to. But most kids from my village were also
an Operations Assistant [TBO]. We didn’t really have a choice. It didn’t mean that
you were pro-Indonesia. It was just another way the military could oppress us. If we
didn’t we would be killed . . . although some did it for the money, we were young
and they forced us [to do it] (Ind.: memaksa kami).
During the course of the New Order, the category of youth became depoliticised by
having their agency limited and became increasingly linked to the state through
incorporation into the military command structure: as Nino remarks, ‘it was just
another way the military could oppress us’. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the
Indonesian police fostered an expansion of the Indonesian scout movement (Ind.:
pramuka) to instil national discipline among both young Indonesians and young
Timorese (CAVR 2005, 27). By May 1978 in Timor, there were 10,000 pramuka
members and by 1981 there were 22,455 members (CAVR 2005, 27). The military also
played a part in these national discipline activities and it sponsored martial arts
groups, such as pencak silat. In these groups young Timorese became intensely
militarised subjects. Both of these organisations demanded training such as
marching, drilling and wearing uniforms, mimicking Indonesian soldiers.
The rise of the group Pemuda Pancasila is an example of the way in which both
Indonesian and Timorese youth increasingly came to play the role of Indonesian state
auxiliaries, par excellence. It brought together two evocative tropes of Indonesian
nationalism: pemuda, literally, the youth, who had become the driving force of
Indonesian nationalism; and Pancasila, the five ideological pillars of the state which
was first mobilised by Sukarno and became an inviolable mantra under Suharto.
Since being accused of transgressing or intending to undermine Pancasila was enough
to convict anyone of subversion, the group’s name already implied a certain extra-
judicial authority. As the group expanded into a powerful national organisation from
its more humble local roots in Northern Sumatra beginning in the early 1980s, it
secured a presence in nearly every village throughout Indonesia (see Ryter 2002).11
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In addition to being particularly targeted by New Order state ideology, Timorese
tertiary students were also targeted by the Indonesian armed forces. By 1990, Timor
had one university and one polytechnic college, and a student regiment (known in
Indonesian as Resimen Mahasiswa, or by its acronym MENWA) was established on
these campuses. Similar to student regiments in Indonesia, this was an additional
avenue for ABRI to indoctrinate students. In Timor, ABRI used the regiment to
infiltrate student organisations and clandestine groups on campus such as the
IMPETTU organisation outlined in the previous section.
In its attempts to control the constitution and orientation of social organisations,
ABRI attempted to establish a sort of patronclient relationship. ABRI would provide
IMPPETTU with assistance such as money for protection. I was told a story that
exemplifies these relations (interview with Tito, Dili, June 15, 2007). A fight broke
out between Timorese students and some local youths in a pool parlour in Malang,
East Java. When the military arrived to intervene, they sided with the Timorese
students. Some of the Timorese, the storyteller recounted, developed an intimidating
reputation and other students were scared of them.
The tactics used by the clandestine operation also became militaristic in nature.
Clandestine members used guerrilla politics to break the trust of the military group’s
infiltration to obtain information (Soares 2010, 114). Violence was often evoked as a
necessary part of a struggle that was constructed as a largely non-violent ‘civilian’
struggle. The sometimes organised and directed violent outbursts of young Timorese
contradicted the rhetoric of peace and a move away from armed conflict to an urban-
based civilian movement. Vasco da Gama ‘Criado’ (interview with Nuno Rodrigues,
Dili, June 10, 2009) stated that, acting upon the instruction of Xanana Gusma˜o in
1997, his organisation attacked the BRIMOB headquarters in Dili with only a few
knives. Four OPJATIL youth group members died and three members were injured.
The line between working for the resistance movement and working for the
Indonesian military became blurred; both operations made use of clandestine
activities involving violence as the case of the Indonesian military operations assistant
illustrates. Many young TBO affiliates launched careers in low-level thuggery and
became auxiliaries of the New Order state and remain important figures in post-New
Order Indonesia.12
The incorporation of young Timorese into the clandestine was a way of reigniting
their youthful energy and giving voice to their frustrations. However, this
incorporation was complicated by the ways in which young people were also forced
to work for the Indonesian military. This perhaps goes some way in explaining why
the narrative of the youth and their heroism was discounted as important in the
reality of Independence.
Young Timorese’ incorporation into military structures required a re-categorisa-
tion and reformulation of thinking about themselves, which was dictated primarily
by regimentation and subordination. Rather than engaging critically (and non-
violently) in the Independence struggle through discussions on university campuses,
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the resistance movement focused on creating militant and narrow spaces within
which youth could serve the purposes of the movement.
Conclusion
During the period of Indonesian occupation, young Timorese, known as the Gerac¸ao
Foun, were constructed in Timor-Leste as a socio-political category that served to fulfil
certain requirements of the resistance movement. Through persuasive and emotive
discourse by the leaders, most notably Xanana Gusma˜o, the call for young people to
take on certain attitudes and characteristics was central to their involvement in the
resistance movement.
The Gerac¸ao Foun became the backbone of the resistance as the clandestine
movement. They also became regimented and subordinate to the armed forces in the
types of activities and organisational structures in which they were involved, and in
the roles they were permitted to play. The new hierarchical structure guided the sorts
of characteristics and behaviours deemed necessary for such an operation. At the
same time as providing young Timorese with a way to channel their frustrations, the
clandestine movement structure was also disempowering in that it limited young
people’s agency. This regimentation also put them in a position to be manipulated by
the Indonesian military for its own purposes.
In order to carry out their specific militarised tasks, a change in behaviour was
required in which certain characteristics were prioritised and others, such as critical
thinking about Independence, were demoted. The development of a culture focusing
on secrecy meant that suspicions were easily aroused and issues were often resolved
through violence because young people lacked the ability to mediate conflict*they
could only draw on the abilities they had developed during the clandestine
movement. Since Independence, a number of younger generation public figures
have spoken out about the impact of the incorporation of youth into the resistance
movement. Aderito Soares, the anti-corruption Commissioner, spoke about the need
to change the ‘culture of command’ that was developed through the imperative to
follow orders in the clandestine movement (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares
2012, 120).
As members of the Gerac¸ao Foun struggle to redefine themselves in post-colonial
Timor-Leste, their sentiments of the past in how they were ‘tricked’ into participating
in the resistance movement challenges the unitary discourse of nationalism and the
current dominant discourse of young people as either ‘hero’ or ‘villain’. While
narratives continue to operate within a framework or national trope of being
‘recompensed’, they no longer expect recompense. The tone of the Gerac¸ao Foun’s
newly reflexive approach to their involvement in the resistance movement is tragic
and markedly non-heroic. Instead of demanding a share of the fruits of the resistance,
their accounts express the sadness and nostalgia felt by ex-clandestine members for
the loss of youthful lives and dreams that were captured, utilised instrumentally and
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truncated in the service of a liberation struggle that considered them, ironically, the
promise of the future of their homeland.
Notes
[1] With the support of the Commission for Research on the Timorese Women’s Resistance
Movement.
[2] This article focuses on the discourses of male members of the clandestine movement as the
clandestine overtly relied upon the work of males. It also reveals how the category of youth with
its socio-political overtones was deeply gendered. However, this is not to erase the active role
played by women involved in the clandestine movement or to recreate the masculine archetype
of youth-hero (see the ongoing work of the Commission for Research on the Timorese Women’s
Resistance Movement, Dili and Bexley (2009) for a discussion on the resistance discourse of
women as keepers of the moral code and the striking lack of support within the resistance
movement to critically discuss the treatment of women).
[3] The youth as ‘defectology’ discourse promulgated by government and international
organisations intensified after the 2006 socio-political crisis where violence occurred on a
daily basis.
[4] The Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor, FRETILIN (Frente Revoluciona´ria de
Timor-Leste Independente) was the political party established in 1974 that gained Timor’s
short Independence from Portugal before being invaded by Indonesia nine days later.
[5] Reference to comparative historical literature about the role of youth in the revolution in
Indonesia in 1945 (Anderson 1972; Ryter 2002; Siegel 1998; Cribb 1991), is useful in
exploring the ways both young Indonesians and young Timorese were incorporated into
their respective resistance movements and the consequences when they were no longer
deemed a critical constituent in the national agenda.
[6] The difference between Java and Timor Leste is that youth was already an essential category
of Javanese society, to which Javanese culture ‘assigned a style and meaning of its own’
(Anderson 1972). Customarily, the transition to adulthood for Timorese was marked by
tooth filing and the chewing of the first beetle nut in preparation for marriage. The Tetum
term, lao lemorai (to travel outside of one’s village) came about during Portuguese
colonisation and expanded the meaning of youth beyond the narrow defined roles and
responsibilities of village life, as (mostly males) left for schooling in seminaries and created
an awareness of their own differences as a distinct cohort in parallel with the rise of
nationalism.
[7] By 1979, 79 per cent of the Supreme Command had been killed, including the Fretilin Vice
President Nicolau Lobato, and 80 per cent of the 4000 FALINTIL troops had been lost, their
support bases destroyed and internal and external lines of communication severed (Taylor
1991, 67).
[8] Other youth organisations included: Frente da Liberatac¸ao Estudantil Cladestina de Timor-
Leste (FECLETIL); Liga dos Estudantes Patriotas (LEP); and Organizac¸a˜o da Juventude
Catolica de Timor-Leste (OJECTIL), which later changed its name to Organizac¸a˜o dos
Jovens e Estudantes de Timor-Leste (OJETIL).
[9] Mariano Sabino Lopes was one of the founders of the Timorese political party, Democrat
Party (PD). He had previously led the IMPPETTU Chapter in Malang, East Java, while
studying for his agronomy degree. He was appointed the Minister for Agriculture and
Fisheries under the AMP government.
[10] In order to reach the general public about the resistance, the clandestine movement
conducted a ‘socialisation’ program whereby organisations were paired with other
organisations that had undergone a formal ‘legalisation’ process and were acknowledged
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by the Indonesian New Order state. These organisations included OJETIL and the scouts,
RENETIL with IMPETTU, HPPMAI, Raculima with DSMPTL (Dewan Solidaritas
Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Timor-Leste).
[11] Ahmad Alkatiri, the brother of former Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, was the head of
Pemuda Pancasila during the Indonesian occupation.
[12] One of the most well-known thugs (preman) is Hercules Rozario Marcal who rose to
notoriety in the Jakarta gangster underworld after starting his career as a TBO. He became
known for his involvement in protection, extortion, gambling and prostitution rackets in
Indonesia and has recently returned to Timor-Leste to engage in a range of business dealings
such as the building of the mini-park (taman mini) opposite Hotel Timor, Dili. Hercules
recently received legal protection from Wiranto’s political party, GERINDRA (Karyono
2013).
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